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This paper studies the effects of marketing choice to firm growth. I assume that firm-level growth
is the result of idiosyncratic productivity improvements with continuous arrival of new potential producers.
A firm enters a market if it is profitable to incur the marginal cost to reach the first consumer and pays
an increasing marketing cost to reach additional consumers. The model is calibrated using data on
the cross-section of firms and their sales across markets as well as the rate of incumbent firm-exit.
The calibrated model quantitatively predicts firm exit, growth, and the resulting firm size distribution
in the US manufacturing data. It also predicts a distribution of firm growth rates that deviates from
Gibrat's law –i.e. independence of firm size and growth– in a manner consistent with the data.
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In the last few decades, economists have focused on explanations for the empirical regularities in
the cross-sectional distribution of ￿rm size and the relationship between initial size of surviving
￿rms and their growth rates.1 A representation of ￿rm technological process that follows Gibrat￿ s
law ￿ i.e. independence of the expected growth rate and initial size￿has been a key element of
theories that attempt to explain such regularities.2 However, relatively little has been done in
understanding the nature of ￿rm demand and how it a⁄ects ￿rm dynamics.
This paper attempts to do so by integrating a theory of marketing choice, based on Arkolakis
(2010), into a model of ￿rm dynamics in which the growth of ￿rm productivities follows Gibrat￿ s
law, as in Luttmer (2007). A ￿rm enters a market if it is pro￿table to incur the marginal cost
to reach the ￿rst consumer and can also incur an increasing marginal marketing cost to reach
more consumers in the market.
The proposed setup provides a generalization of previous theories of ￿rm growth based on
Gibrat￿ s law. In particular, with constant marginal costs to reach additional consumers the
model provides a dynamic extension of the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) multi-
market (international trade) setup of Melitz (2003)-Chaney (2008) with Gibrat￿ s law embedded
in ￿rm behavior. However, with increasing marginal costs the model generates an e⁄ective
demand for the ￿rms where the demand elasticity declines with ￿rm size and asymptotically
tends to the CES demand elasticity. I illustrate that the new model can capture two salient
features of the data regarding ￿rm turnover and growth and that it can serve as a reliable
framework for a number of quantitative applications.
First, the model o⁄ers a simpler setup for the entry and exit of ￿rms that implies that the
size of entrants is typically small and roughly equal to the size of exiting ￿rms, as reported
for the US manufacturing ￿rm data from Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) (henceforth
DRS). In a standard sunk cost setup, which assumes a one-time cost of entry to a market, the
average size of entrants is larger than that of exiting ￿rms. To model the entry-exit process I
follow Kortum (1997) and Eaton and Kortum (2001), and assume that the rate at which new
1Unless otherwise noted, I will refer to ￿rm size as ￿rm sales. Sales are typically available for very ￿ne
categorizations and also for di⁄erent markets. See Sutton (1997), Caves (1998) and Axtell (2001) for discussion
of the empirical ￿ndings on ￿rm size distribution and the inverse relationship between initial size of ￿rms and
their exit and growth rates (as well as the variance of their growth rates).
2Gibrat￿ s law is combined with endogenous exit of small ￿rms with negative growth rates to generate the
inverse exit rate-size relationship. These forces combined lead to higher growth rates of small surviving ￿rms.
See for example Klette and Kortum (2004), Lentz and Mortensen (2008), and Luttmer (2007) among others.
1ideas arrive is exogenously given. Each idea can be used by a monopolistically competitive ￿rm
to produce a di⁄erentiated good and potentially generate pro￿ts. These ideas become ￿rms only
if they are used in production. If not, they enter a ￿mothball￿state until a future shock in their
productivity makes production pro￿table again.
Second, I show that the model with endogenous market penetration costs can reconcile the
inverse relationship between ￿rm growth and initial size with the inverse relationship of the
variance of ￿rm growth and initial size. In the Luttmer (2007) setup small ￿rms with negative
growth rates are faced with an endogenous exit decision. Thus, ￿rms with small initial size that
survive, have higher expected growth rates but their variance of growth is lower, compared to
￿rms with larger initial size. This prediction sharply contradicts empirical observations. In the
endogenous cost model, the marketing choice for small ￿rms is very volatile, which has as a
result a higher variance of growth rate for these ￿rms. In addition, because of the marketing
choice, the model implies a strikingly di⁄erent distribution of growth rates of small ￿rms vis-a-
vis a setup where Gibrat￿ s law holds, with some small ￿rms growing at a very fast pace. The
higher elasticity of demand implies higher variance of growth but also the potential for higher
expected growth for smaller ￿rms.
To quantitatively assess the predictions of the model, I exploit the cross-sectional restrictions
that the multi-market structure of the model imposes. Therefore, I use the same parameter
values as in the static calibration of the international trade model of Arkolakis (2010) since
at each point in time the dynamic model is identical to its static multi-market counterpart.
In addition, I calibrate the drift and the variance of the stochastic process that governs ￿rm
growth without using information on ￿rm growth. To do so, I once again exploit the multi-
market structure of the model and the fact that the elasticity of trade in the model is the shape
parameter of the (Pareto) size distribution of ￿rms, as in the static model. This parameter
endogenously arises in the model as a function of the drift and the variance of the stochastic
process. With this calibration the dynamic model retains contact to its static counterpart and
delivers rich dynamic predictions with ￿ e⁄ectively￿only one additional crucial parameter.
The calibrated model is used to quantitatively explain the exit and growth of sales of US
manufacturing ￿rms reported by DRS for a time span of 2 decades. The entry-exit process
implied from the model closely matches the exit rates of both incumbent ￿rms and new entrants.
Additionally, the benchmark model can generate the small initial size and the sales growth rates
of new entrants over time. The ￿t of the model is notable despite the minimal information that
2is used for its calibration.
A series of additional evidence regarding the quantitative predictions of the model are also
provided. In particular, the model performs well in predicting the size distribution of ￿rms even
conditional on their age. This success suggests that the cross-sectional results on ￿rm size are
intimately linked to the dynamic ones, hence the desirability of a ￿uni￿ed￿theory to analyze
them. I also use data for export transactions of Brazilian ￿rms by destination to illustrate that,
consistent with the entry-exit process postulated in this model, ￿rms are very likely to return to
exporting after a year of no exporting activity. Furthermore, the distribution of growth rates of
Brazilian exporters in a destination, conditional on their initial exporting size in that market,
is similar to the one predicted by the model.3
The theory predicts an inverse relationship of ￿rm size and growth, also discussed by Rossi-
Hansberg and Wright (2007) and Luttmer (2011). In the ￿nal section of the paper I discuss how
empirical tests that were used as evidence against the inverse size-growth relationship (such as
measuring growth as suggested by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996)) are not appropriate if
the underlying growth of productivities follows a random walk as postulated in this paper and
Luttmer (2007).
The demand-based explanation of this paper also implies that all its predictions carry over
when considering the sales of a ￿rm in a given (export) market. It is consistent with the growth
and exit patterns of Brazilian exporters and the robustness of French exporters size distribution
across destinations reported in Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011). This evidence cannot
be explained by the mechanism of ￿nancial constraints (see for example Cooley and Quadrini
(2001) and Arellano, Bai, and Zhang (2008)) that implies a relationship of ￿rm growth with
overall ￿rm size.4
The paper follows a large tradition of models of ￿rm dynamics with a continuum of hetero-
geneous ￿rms. Such models are examined by Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Klette and
Kortum (2004), Luttmer (2007) among others.5 As in the celebrated work of Yule (1925) and
3Impullitti, Irarrazabal, and Opromolla (2006) and Atkeson and Burstein (2010) develop two-country exten-
sions of Luttmer (2007). Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2009) adapt a framework of entry and exit similar to the
one in this paper. The authors retain the main assumptions of the ￿xed cost framework (without assuming sunk
costs of exporting) and study the theoretically implied entry-exit patterns into individual destinations.
4For a recent theoretical analysis of the e⁄ects of ￿rm demand on ￿rm growth see also Foster, Haltiwanger, and
Syverson (2010). In models of learning such as Jovanovic (1982), ￿rm growth depends primarily on age rather
than on size, which is a key di⁄erence from the framework of this paper. In addition, whereas the quantitative
predictions of ￿rm-learning models have been relatively unexplored, the relationship of growth to size and age
in these models crucially depends on parameterization.
5Lentz and Mortensen (2008) and Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2009) develop models of ￿rm dynamics
3Simon (1955), I use the two minimal su¢ cient conditions of random entry-exit and Gibrat￿ s law
to generate a cross-sectional distribution with Pareto right tails (see Reed (2001)). Random
entry and exit is used in lieu of the assumption of a lower exit or re￿ ective barrier and consti-
tutes a major technical simpli￿cation compared to prior related work (see for example Luttmer
(2007) or Gabaix (1999)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the quantitative evidence
on ￿rm selection, growth, and size distribution. Section 3 and 4 develop the ￿rm-dynamics
framework and provide an analytical characterization of its theoretical predictions. Sections 5
and 6 calibrate the model and evaluate its quantitative predictions and Section 7 discusses the
implications of the theory for the growth-size debate.
2 Quantitative Facts on Firm Selection, Growth and Sizes
This section summarizes the ￿ndings of a set of studies that present empirical regularities
regarding the entry and exit of ￿rms, their growth, and their cross-sectional size distribution.
In the rest of the analysis, the term ￿incumbent cohort￿refers to ￿rms that were in the market
at a certain census year (normalized as year 0).6 The survivors of that cohort at year t are
the ￿rms from the cohort which also sell in the market at year t. The term ￿entry cohort￿
refers to ￿rms that enter the market between the current census and the previous one. Thus,
by construction, incumbent cohort includes the surviving ￿rms from all past entry cohorts as
well as the ￿rms of the current entry cohort. In the next two subsections, and in Figures 2 and
3, I discuss the quantitative facts of DRS on US manufacturing ￿rm selection and growth (also
summarized in Table 3). Both ￿gures suggest that ￿rm behavior is roughly independent of the
starting year of the cohorts. All the data are based on means across manufacturing 4-digit SIC
industries.
extending the theories of Klette and Kortum (2004) and Hopenhayn (1992) respectively. In turn, their models
inherit many of the qualitative features of these theories.
6In this paper I focus on empirical facts on ￿rms, instead of plants, which can be compared to facts on the
behavior of exporters, collected at the ￿rm-level. This choice also justi￿es the use of a theoretical framework
with monopolistically competitive ￿rms. Most of the facts I summarize are also true for plants.
42.1 Facts on Firm Entry and Exit
Figure 2 illustrates the fraction of exiting ￿rms from incumbent and entry cohorts. The fraction
of exitors is by construction 0% in year 0 of each cohort and increases as more ￿rms of the
cohort exit the market. Two features clearly emerge. First, the exit rates in the census data
are very large. After 15 years, only about a quarter of the incumbent cohort ￿rms and around
12% of the entry cohort ￿rms are still active. Second, the exit rates of the entry cohorts are
consistently higher than those of the incumbent cohort. Since the incumbent cohorts include
￿rms from the current entry cohorts, exit rates of the entry cohorts account for a large part of
the overall incumbent-cohort exit.
An additional robust feature of the data is that the average size of entrants and exitors is
very similar. In Table 1, I report the related statistics from DRS illustrating this fact, which
will be important for comparison across models:
Fact 1 The average size of entering and exiting ￿rms is approximately the same.
2.2 Facts on Firm Growth
I now present evidence from DRS for the growth in the average size of incumbent and entry
cohorts in order to illuminate the patterns of ￿rm-growth. In Figure 3, I plot the average sales
of surviving ￿rms from incumbent and entry cohorts. The average size of incumbent-cohort
￿rms increases to around 3.2 times the size of all ￿rms in the span of 15 years. Upon entry, the
average size of entry-cohort ￿rms is only about 1/3 of the average size of all ￿rms. However, 15
years later the average size of the surviving entry-cohort ￿rms is around 30% larger than the
size of all ￿rms. Arguably, much of the growth of the average sales of ￿rms, and especially ￿rms
in the entry cohort, is accounted by the fact that the exit rates are high. In relation to Figure 2
notice also that the higher exit rates of entrants are consistent with their smaller average size.
Whereas DRS report statistics aggregated by cohorts, a large literature has been devoted
to understanding the relationship of ￿rm growth and size using micro data. Research as early
as Mans￿eld (1962) has demonstrated a robust inverse relationship between size and growth of
surviving ￿rms in the data. A similar inverse relationship between the variance of ￿rm growth
rates and the size of ￿rms has been identi￿ed.7 These two key features of the relationship of
7See for example Sutton (1997) and Caves (1998) for the ￿rm size-growth relationship and Caves (1998) and
Sutton (2002) for relationship between ￿rm size and variance of growth.
5￿rm growth rates as a function of ￿rm size can be summarized as follows:
Fact 2 For surviving ￿rms the growth rate and its variance declines with ￿rm size.
2.3 Facts on the Firm Size Distribution
Since data for the ￿rm sales distribution are not provided by DRS, I appeal to di⁄erent data
sources. Detailed data on the size distribution of US manufacturing ￿rms are reported by the
Small Business Administration. These data report the number of ￿rms in various size bins. The
sales distribution is plotted in Figures 4 and 5 where the sales of the ￿rms (divided by mean
sales) are in logarithms in both ￿gures while the rank of the ￿rm is not in logarithms in Figure
4. The ￿rst graph clearly illustrates that most of the ￿rms in the data are very small. Figure
5 zooms in on the top decile of the ￿rms and indicates that the size distribution of the larger
￿rms is roughly linear in logarithms and thus can be approximated by the Pareto distribution.
By comparing these two ￿gures one concludes that the size distribution of manufacturing ￿rms
appears to exhibit large departures from the Pareto distribution, challenging the view postulated
by Axtell (2001). These ￿ndings are very similar to the ones reported in Eaton, Kortum, and
Kramarz (2011) for French manufacturing ￿rms. In the same ￿gure I overlay the distribution
of sales of manufacturing ￿rms in France. The two distributions exhibit remarkable similarity.
The decomposition of the ￿rm size for ￿rms of di⁄erent ages has been the topic of a recent
contribution by Cabral and Mata (2003), where the authors consider the employment size dis-
tribution of Portuguese ￿rms. The authors report non-parametric estimates for the employment
size distribution as a function of ￿rm age illustrated in Figure 6. They ￿nd that the sizes of
younger ￿rms sales are concentrated in the lower ends of the size distribution (entrants are
typically of small employment size) whereas the size distribution of the largest ￿rms converges
to a log-normal distribution.8 In the next section I lay out the elements of a simple model that
can account for the ￿rm-level facts summarized above.
8Amaral, Buldyrev, Havlin, Leschhorn, Mass, Salinger, Stanley, and Stanley (1997) study the distribution
of sizes of US manufacturing ￿rms in the compustat database, which typically contains larger publicly-traded
￿rms, and they also ￿nd evidence for lognormal distribution of ￿rm sizes.
63 The Model
The model introduces market penetration costs, as modeled in Arkolakis (2010), within a ￿rm-
dynamics setup similar to Luttmer (2007). I develop a multi-market version of this setup where
the decisions of the ￿rms are independent across markets. Thus, the predictions of the model
for ￿rm entry-exit and growth apply to the operation of the ￿rm in each market, conditional on
its size in that market.
3.1 Model Setup
Time is continuous and indexed by t. The importing market is denoted with an index j and
the exporting market with i, where i;j = 1;:::;N. At each time t, market j is populated by a
continuum of consumers of measure Ljt = Ljeg￿t, where g￿ is the growth rate of the population,
g￿ ￿ 0. I assume that each good ! is produced by a single ￿rm and each ￿rm reaches consumers
independently from other ￿rms. Therefore, at a given point in time t, a consumer l 2 [0;Ljt] has
access to a potentially di⁄erent set of goods ￿l
jt. Firms di⁄er ex-ante only in their productivity,
z, and their source market i. I consider a symmetric equilibrium where all ￿rms of type z
from market i choose to charge the same price in j, pijt (z), and reach consumers there with
probability, nijt (z) 2 [0;1]. The existence of a large number of ￿rms implies that every consumer
from j has access to the same distribution of prices for goods of di⁄erent types. The existence
of a large number of consumers in market j implies that the fraction of consumers reached by
a ￿rm of type z from i is nijt (z) and their total measure is nijt (z)Ljt.
Each consumer from market j has preferences over a consumption stream fCjtgt￿0 of a









where ￿ > 0 is the discount rate and ￿ > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The











where cijt (z) is the consumption of a good produced by a ￿rm z in market i and ￿ is the
7elasticity of substitution among di⁄erent varieties of goods where ￿ > 1. dMijt (z) is the density
of goods of a given type z from market i that are actually sold to j. Since consumers from
market j have access to the same distribution of prices, their level of consumption Cjt is the
same.
Each household earns labor income wjt from selling its unit labor endowment in the labor
market and pro￿ts ￿jt from the ownership of domestic ￿rms. Thus, the demand for good z from

















1￿￿ n￿jt (z)dM￿jt (z) . (1)
Given the de￿nition of the price index, Pjt, the budget constraint faced by each consumer is
CjtPjt = yjt . Thus, the total e⁄ective demand in market j for a ￿rm of type z from i is







3.2 Entry and Exit
An ￿ idea￿is a way to produce a good !: Each idea is exclusively owned and grants a monopoly
over the related good. This exclusivity implies a monopolistic competition setup as in Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) and Melitz (2003). However, in my context ideas become ￿rms only if they
are used into production. If not, they enter a ￿mothball￿state until a future shock in their
productivity makes production pro￿table. Once ideas are born, they die at an exogenous rate
￿ ￿ 0. To be consistent with balanced growth, I also assume that each market innovates at an
exogenous rate gB ￿ ￿. This rate will be speci￿ed when I construct the balanced growth path
and implies that the measure of existing ideas at time t in i is Jie(gB￿￿)t, where Ji > 0 is the
initial measure of ideas in i.
New ideas arrive with an initial productivity, ￿ zit, given by
￿ zit = ￿ zie
gEt ,
8where ￿ zi;gE > 0. Productivity evolves over time in a manner speci￿ed in the next subsection.
The parameter gE is interpreted as the growth rate of the frontier of new ideas and all new ideas
at time t enter with the same productivity. This speci￿cation incorporates a form of ￿creative
destruction￿since more recent ideas arrive with a higher productivity.9 In fact, I show that in
the balanced growth path there exists a cuto⁄productivity of pro￿table operation at each time
t, z￿
ijt, and this cuto⁄ grows at a rate gE. z￿
ijt is determined by the zero pro￿t condition at each
point in time. Since there is no indivisible cost of production or entry, ideas with productivity
higher than z￿
ijt are used in production and appear as ￿rms in market j.10
This setup for entry and exit makes the model substantially more tractable than Luttmer
(2007), since there are no forward looking decisions for the ￿rms. Additionally, it captures the
possibility that a ￿rm may temporarily shut down as discussed in Lee and Mukoyama (2008).
These temporary shutdowns may appear, for example, because of plant retooling or because of
classi￿cation issues, such as ￿rms going from employment to non-employment status. Mainly
due to these classi￿cation issues, quantitative information on ￿rm re-entry in the domestic data
is scarce. Thus, in order to compute model￿ s statistics for ￿rm entry and exit I replicate as
closely as possible the measurement procedures used in the data. However, this phenomenon of
temporary exit is prevalent in the exporting data as discussed in section 6.4.
3.3 Firms and Ideas
Ideas can produce in each period for any of their markets using a standard constant returns to
scale production function q (z) = zl, where l is the amount of labor used in production and z is
the labor productivity of the idea at a given point in time. This productivity depends on the
date tb at which it was born and evolves with age a, independently across ideas, according to
ztb;a = ￿ zi exp
￿
gEt
b + gIa + ￿zWa
￿
, (3)
9Extending this simple case to one in which new entrants arrive with di⁄erent productivities drawn from a
non-atomic distribution is straightforward (see, for example, Reed (2002)). In particular, unless entrants are
speci￿ed to be very large with a high probability the right tails of the distribution will be una⁄ected. In addition,
the process of growth of ideas and ￿rms is not a⁄ected by entry.
10In the one market model, allowing for free entry of ideas with a ￿xed amount of labor used for each new idea
would imply a setup with identical predictions. The only di⁄erence would arise because pro￿ts would accrue to
labor used for the entry cost as in Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow, and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2008). However, such an
extension would require further changes in the multi-market framework given that pro￿ts from entry arise from
the operation into multiple markets.
9where Wa ￿ N (0;a) is a Brownian motion with independent increments and the parameter ￿z
regulates the volatility of the growth of ideas. Note that the productivity of incumbent ideas is
improving on average at a rate gI. A ￿rm is an idea put to work to produce and market a good.
This speci￿cation for the evolution of productivities, borrowed from Luttmer (2007), im-
plies that the expected growth of productivities is independent of ￿rm size. Similar processes
have been widely used to represent ￿rm growth since Gibrat (1931). The Brownian motion
assumption naturally emerges as the continuous time limit of a ￿rm growth rate that is a
discrete-random walk. Notably, the assumption of continuous time is not crucial for the results.
What is important for predictions on ￿rm growth is that the growth rates are normally distrib-
uted. Continuous time is convenient, however, for analytically characterizing the properties of
the model.
In order to sell in a given market, ￿rms pay a market penetration cost which is a function
of the number of consumers reached in that market. I model these market penetration costs
using the speci￿cation of Arkolakis (2010) derived from ￿rst principles as a cost of marketing. I
assume that these costs are incurred by the ￿rms at each instant of time, analogous to previous
models, such as Melitz (2003) and Luttmer (2007), in which a per market ￿xed cost is required
for the ￿rm to operate at each point of time.11









￿￿+1 for ￿ 2 [0;1) [ (1;+1)
￿L￿
  log(1 ￿ n) for ￿ = 1
.
where ￿ 2 [0;1] and   > 0. If ￿ < 1, the market penetration costs to reach a certain number
of consumers decrease with the population size of the market. The parameter ￿ governs the
convexity of the marketing cost function: higher ￿ implies more convexity and steeper increases
in the marginal cost to reach more consumers. For simplicity, I assume that labor from the
destination market is hired for marketing purposes. This speci￿cation implies that the total
market penetration cost paid by a ￿rm from i that reaches a fraction n of consumers in market
j is wjF (n;Lj).
In addition to the cost to reach consumers, the ￿rm has to pay a variable trade cost modeled
11A model that examines state dependence of market penetration costs on previous marketing decisions is
left for future research. Drozd and Nosal (2011) and Gourio and Rudanko (2010) develop models where a
representative ￿rm￿ s demand is modeled as marketing capital that accumulates over time. My modeling of
marketing is static which allows me to analytically characterize the various properties of the model.
10using the standard iceberg formulation. This iceberg cost implies that a ￿rm operating in i and
selling to market j must ship ￿ij > 1 units in order for one unit of the good to arrive at the
destination, where I normalize ￿ii = 1.
3.4 Firm Optimization
Given the constant returns to scale production technology and the separability of the marketing
cost function across markets, the decision of a ￿rm to sell to a given market is independent of
the decision to sell to other markets. Total pro￿ts of a particular ￿rm are the summation of
the pro￿ts from exporting activities in all markets j = 1;:::;N (or a subset thereof). Thus, at
a given time t, the ￿rm￿ s problem is the same as in Arkolakis (2010), and ￿rm z from i solves
the following static maximization problem for each given market j:12



















s.t. nijt 2 [0;1] 8t .
For any ￿, the optimal decisions of the ￿rm in the multi-market model are:
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ijt is de￿ned by
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Equation (7) reveals that, apart from general equilibrium considerations, the cuto⁄productivity
z￿
ijt, and thus the entry-exit decision of the ￿rm, does not depend on the parameter ￿. Intuitively,
12Slighly abusing the notation, I denote the decision of the ￿rm only as a function of its productivity z,
supressing time of birth and age information. Given that the optimization decision is static, the current level of
productivity is the only state variable. I keep the notation parsimonious throughout the text whenever possible.
11￿ regulates the convexity of marketing costs, but not the level of the cost to reach the very ￿rst
consumers, and thus it does not a⁄ect ￿rm entry and exit.
Substituting (4), (5) and (7) into the expression for sales per ￿rm, (2), and multiplying it by
the price, equation (4), the sales of ￿rm z originating from market i in market j can be written
as




















￿ c1 = ￿ ￿ 1, ￿ c2 = (￿ ￿ 1)
(￿ ￿ 1)
￿
, ~   =
 
￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿)
,
and ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿it=yit is the fraction of pro￿ts out of total income. In the balanced growth path
equilibrium, this fraction is constant and thus, I suppress its subscripts. Equation (8) reveals
that for ￿ = 0 all ￿rms selling from i to j sell a minimum amount, L￿
jtyjt=~  , while for ￿ > 0
this amount is 0. Conditional on entry, more productive ￿rms have higher sales as equation (8)
indicates. These ￿rms charge lower prices and thus sell more per consumer (i.e. at the intensive
margin). In addition, if ￿ > 0; they also reach more consumers (i.e. the extensive margin) as
implied by equation (5). However, if ￿ = 0, all entrants in market j optimally choose nij = 1.
These di⁄erences in ￿ are re￿ ected in ￿rm growth-patterns as I illustrate in section 4.
3.5 Balanced Growth Path Equilibrium
To solve for the cross-sectional distribution of ￿rm sales, I consider the stationary balanced
growth path. From expression (8), ￿rm sales are determined by the ratio of ￿rm productivity
to the cuto⁄ productivity. Given that, it is convenient to ￿rst characterize the stationary
distribution of productivities detrended by the rate of growth of the zero pro￿t cuto⁄,
￿a = ￿ zi exp
￿
gEt









= ￿ zi expf(gI ￿ gE)a + ￿zWag .
The logarithm of ￿a is a Brownian motion with a drift,
sa = ln￿a = ￿ si + (gI ￿ gE)a + ￿zWa , (9)
12where ￿ si = ln ￿ zi. sa will be used as a proxy for the productivity of an idea or the size of a
￿rm after a years given that ￿rms with larger sa are (weakly) larger in sales, productivity and
employment. The term gI ￿gE; is the di⁄erence between the growth of incumbent ideas and the
growth of the frontier of new ideas. Hereafter, I will denote this di⁄erence by ￿. The probability
density of the logarithm of productivities, sa = s, for a given generation of ideas of age a > 0


















This distribution will allow the model to match the ￿ndings of Cabral and Mata (2003) that
the size distribution of old ￿rms converges to a log-normal distribution.
The productivity distribution of one age cohort of ideas is not age-stationary. But considering
all ideas, across di⁄erent ages, delivers a stationary cross-sectional distribution of productivities
of all ideas from i, fi (s). In a stationary equilibrium, with entry and exit of ideas, the dynam-











i (s) ￿ gBfi (s) = 0 . (11)
Intuitively, in a stationary steady state, the net changes at each point s of the distribution (the
￿rst two terms) must equal the reduction of the probability density due to entry and exit, at




= ￿ + gB ￿ ￿ | {z }
entry rate
at point ￿ si
.
The net changes are due to the stochastic ￿ ows of productivities in and out of that point
13See for example Harrison (1985) p. 37. fi (s;a) can be derived as the solution of the di⁄erential equation




i (s;a) , with initial condition fi (s;a) = ￿(s ￿ ￿ si), where ￿(:) is the Dirac delta
function. Additionally, the realizations of the Brownian motion over di⁄erent time periods, sa1;sa2;:::;san, follow
a multivariate normal distribution with means Esa = s0+￿a and covariances Cov (sa;sa0) = ￿2
z [min(a;a0)]. This
feature can be used to further scrutinize the model, or to pursue an alternative estimation of its parameters,
by looking at the probability distribution of sales and entry exit decisions of individual ￿rms overtime, for
researchers that have access to this information.
14In an appendix available online, I provide a di⁄erent proof by expliciltly calculating f (s) = R +1
0 e￿[gB]af (s;a)da. That proof, while more straightforward, provides less intuition on the exact forces that
give rise to the shape of the cross sectional distribution of productivities across all ideas. Reed (2001) provides
another proof using moment generating functions in which the intuition is also somewhat limited.
13described by equation (11).
The density of productivities, fi (s), has to satisfy a set of conditions. The ￿rst requirement
is that ￿1 is an absorbing barrier which implies
lim
s!￿1fi (s) = 0 . (12)
In addition fi (s), must be a probability density which implies that
fi (s) ￿ 0 , 8s 2 (￿1;+1) (13)





fi (s)ds = 1 . (14)
Additionally, net in￿ ows into the distribution must equal the net out￿ ows:15







i (￿ si￿) ￿ f
0
i (￿ si+)] = gB . (15)
The left-hand side is the net in￿ ows into the distribution from point ￿ si. The right-hand side is
the out￿ ows from the distribution due to new entry and random exit of ideas. By continuity,
the ￿rst term in brackets is zero. However, entry of new ideas implies that the distribution is
kinked at ￿ si. Intuitively, the rate of change of the cdf changes direction at ￿ si because entry






￿1+￿2e￿1(s￿￿ si) if s < ￿ si
￿1￿2


















> 0 . (18)
The following assumption guarantees that a time-invariant distribution exists and an ever
15This condition results by integrating (11) over all s 2 (￿1; ￿ si) [ (￿ si;+1), i.e. considering the net in￿ ows
from point ￿ si to the rest of the distribution. Similar conditions are used in labor models to characterize the
behavior of the distribution at a point of entry to or exit from a particular occupation (see for example Moscarini
(2005) and Papageorgiou (2008)).
14increasing fraction of ideas is not concentrated in either of the tails of the distribution:16
A 1 : The rate of innovation is positive, gB > 0.
In particular, given that gB ￿ ￿, then assuming ￿ = 0 together with A1 implies that gB > ￿.




z=2 = gB > 0 . (19)
The resulting cross-sectional distribution of detrended productivities ￿ 2 [0;+1) is the so-called
double Pareto distribution (Reed (2001)) with probability density function:17

















if ￿ ￿ ￿ zi
(20)
The double Pareto distribution is illustrated in Figure 1. A closer look at the probability
density of productivities (equation (20)) reveals that at each moment of time, a constant fraction
of ideas ￿1=(￿1 + ￿2) is above the threshold ￿ zi. To keep all the expressions of the model as simple
as possible, I assume for the rest of the paper that 1=  is su¢ ciently high so that z￿
ijt > ￿ zit, 8i, j,
t. Thus, the (detrended) cross-sectional distribution of operating ideas (i.e. ￿rms) in each market
j is Pareto with shape parameter ￿2. Whereas A1 is necessary for a stationary distribution an
additional assumption guarantees that the resulting distributions of ￿rm productivities and sales
have a ￿nite mean:











Assumption A2 implies that the entry rate of new ideas is larger than the growth rate of
productivities and sales of the most productive incumbent ￿rms. Notice that A2 and A1 (see
equation (19)) also imply the common restriction that the Pareto shape coe¢ cient, ￿2, is larger
16Under the assumption ￿ > 0, Pareto distribution emerges in the right-tail of the distribution for the limit
case of ￿z ! 0. However, both ￿ < 0 and ￿z > 0 will be essential features of the model in explaining the data
as I illustrate in the calibration section.
17This distribution can also be thought of as a limit case of the distribution of ￿rms derived by Luttmer (2007)
when the exit cuto⁄ goes to ￿1. However, in his case, this assumption would imply that ￿rms never exit and
that there is no selection in the model.
15than both 1 and ￿ ￿ 1. To summarize, A1 and A2 imply a set of restrictions, not necessarily
independent, between ￿, ￿z, ￿ and gB.
I will now construct a balanced growth path equilibrium for this economy. To do so I assume
that the entry rate of new ideas is
gB = g￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ , (21)
implying that the number of ideas above the entry point will be ￿1=(￿1 + ￿2)Jieg￿(1￿￿)t. Aggre-
gate variables, wit, Cit grow at a rate g￿ where
g￿ = gE + g￿ (1 ￿ ￿)=(￿ ￿ 1). (22)
The growth rate of the ideas and thus the varieties adds to the growth rate of the frontier of
new productivities, gE, with a rate that is larger when goods are less substitutable.18
Finally, notice that in the balanced growth path the cross-sectional distribution of ￿rm sales
and the bilateral trade shares, ￿ij, remain unchanged. This means that at each point in time,
this model collapses to the endogenous cost model of Arkolakis (2010) when ￿ > 0 and the ￿xed
cost Chaney (2008) model when ￿ ! 0.
Proposition 1 Given A1-A2, and the values of g￿, gB given by the equations (22) and (21)
respectively there exists a balanced growth path for the economy.
Proof. By assumption we have that Lit = Lieg￿t and Jit = Jieg￿(1￿￿)t, and ￿ zit = ￿ zi exp(gEt).
De￿ne z￿
ijt = z￿
ijegEt, such that z￿
ij > ￿ zi, wit = wieg￿t, Cit = Cieg￿t, Pit = Pi. Given these
assumptions and de￿nitions, the cross-sectional distribution of the productivities of operating
￿rms is Pareto. For each cross section of the model, the share of pro￿ts in total income equals
















In turn, the equilibrium variables wit, Pit, z￿
ijt are characterized by the trade balance condition
18The equilibrium also requires that the value of the aggregate endowment is ￿nite. In order for this to happen
the discount rate must exceed the rate of growth of the economy and thus preference and technology parameters
must satisfy ￿ + 1
￿g￿ > g￿ + g￿. This restriction and in particular the values of the parameters ￿ and ￿ play no
essential role in my analysis and will not be discussed altogether in what follows.
16wiLi =
P
￿ ￿i￿w￿L￿, 8i, the price index given by (1), 8i, and the productivity cuto⁄ condition
given by (7) for 8i;j. Simply substituting the guessed values of the variables into these equilib-
rium equations reveals that the guess is correct since the equations hold for 8t. It also allows to
solve for the values of z￿
ij, wi, Pi using the same equations. Finally, Ci, can be solved using the
budget constraint completing the construction of the balanced growth path.
Moreover, although it is not necessary for the existence of a balanced growth path, I will, in
general, restrict the analysis to parameter values that will allow me to match the facts on ￿rm
growth rates as a function of ￿rm size. These parameter values will imply that the productivity
growth of ￿rms is not too negative, so that there is positive growth, on average, in the extensive
margin of consumers for the smaller ￿rms.
R 1 : Productivity and sales parameters satisfy ￿(￿ ￿ 1) + (￿ ￿ 1)
2 ￿2
z > 0.
This restriction will hold true in the calibration.
4 Theoretical Predictions of the Model
I will now proceed to describe the theoretical properties of the model and sketch the connection
to the empirical ￿ndings presented in section 2. Details for the various derivations are in the
appendix. To facilitate exposition I will de￿ne some additional terms. Aside from the fact that
there is exogenous death of ideas, the productivity of an idea can be considered at a given time
~ t as a new process starting from current productivity z~ t. For convenience, I de￿ne a proxy of
the relative ￿size￿of an idea from a given origin i to a given destination j when a years have





, a ￿ 0. (24)
sija follows a Brownian motion with initial condition sij0, drift ￿, and standard deviation ￿z.
Notice that given the expression for sales, equation (8), the variable sij0 and the aggregate
variables summarize current ￿rm behavior in market j. In particular, if sij0 < 0 the ￿rm does
not currently sell in market j.
174.1 Firm Entry and Exit
I ￿rst illustrate analytical relationships for ￿rm and cohort survival rates that provide a more
intuitive interpretation of the workings of ￿rm-selection in the model. In particular, the survival
function for a ￿rm of initial size sij0 = s0 > 0, Sij (ajsij0 = s0), is de￿ned as the probability of
selling in market j after a years conditional on initial size in the market, and is given by









where ￿(￿) denotes the cdf of the normal distribution. This expression implies that ￿rms with
larger initial size in a market, sij0 = s0 > 0, have higher probability of selling in this market next
period. Notice that the survival function only depends on the size of the ￿rm in the market, s0,
implying that the probability of exit of a ￿rm in a market depends on its relative size there.
Integrating the ￿rm survival rates across di⁄erent initial sizes the model delivers an analytical
characterization of the survival rates of a given ￿incumbent￿cohort of ￿rms from i that sell to
j,




























This expression is strictly decreasing in a if ￿ < 0.19 The expression depends on the productivity
distribution parameter ￿2 that regulates the relative density of ￿rms around the exit productivity
cuto⁄, z￿
ijt, and thus the number of ￿rms that are likely to exit in near the future.
Overall, the model is qualitatively consistent with the evidence on ￿rm exit illustrated in
section 2. In particular, consistent with Figure 2 the model generates high attrition for the
new entrants, since these ￿rms enter with small sizes, and also for the incumbent cohorts, if the
distribution has enough density around z￿
ijt. These results are driven by the productivity process
adapted by Luttmer (2007) and the entry-exit process postulated in this paper, by dispensing
of his assumption of a sunk cost of entry. This feature of the model implies that the average
size of entrants is small and by construction equal to the size of exitors, consistent with Fact 1.
Notice that given the process for individual productivities, the parameters ￿ and ￿ do not play
any role in entry and exit. These two parameters are crucial for ￿rm growth, which I discuss
next.
19Since the empirically relevant case will turn out to be ￿ < 0 I will mainly discuss the prediction of the model
under this restriction in the main text.
184.2 Firm Growth
Given the assumption of Gibrat￿ s law in productivity growth and the CES preferences speci￿-
cation, two distinct forces act so that Gibrat￿ s law does not hold for the growth of ￿rms in each
market: the selection e⁄ects and the market penetration technology. I analyze each of these
forces separately.
4.2.1 Firm Selection and Firm Growth
I ￿rst examine the changes in the mean and the variance of the natural logarithm of sales for
the case of ￿ ! 0. The moments of the logarithm of sales function can be obtained using
the moment generating function. I de￿ne the growth over the period of a years as ^ Gija =
logrij~ t+a (sija) ￿ logrij~ t (sij0). The expected ￿rm growth given initial size is20
E
￿
^ Gijajsija > 0;sij0 = s0
￿











where m(x) = ’(x)=￿(￿x) is the inverse Mills ratio, with ’(x) the pdf of the standard normal
distribution. The third term of this expression appears because of selection and is decreasing
in size, s0, and converging to 0 for large s0 (see appendix A.1, property P1). Thus, the force
of selection by itself implies that growth rates are declining in initial size. Gibrat￿ s law is
approximately true for the largest ￿rms, which are una⁄ected by the selection forces.
The variance of ￿rm growth given initial size is
V
￿
^ Gijajsija > 0;sij0 = s0
￿




























The term in the brackets incorporates the e⁄ects of selection and can be shown that it is increas-




a .21 In turn, V is increasing in s0 and in fact for large s0 it converges
20The correction for the selection bias is di⁄erent from the speci￿cation of Heckman (1979) in that entry and
sales decision are perfectly correlated in my case (both driven by productivity shocks). Partial correlation can
be generated, for example, if there exists randomness in a term that would in￿ uence entry but is not perfectly
correlated to sales. The obvious candidate term in this model is the parameter 1= . The econometric techiques
developed to adjust for selection bias by Heckman (1979) could be appropriate for this case. Such an approach
has been used by Evans (1987b).
21The proof can be found in Sampford (1953). More generally, the result that the left truncated variance
is decreasing in the truncation point (and thus is increasing in the size of the ￿rm) holds for all distributions
with logconcave pdf (see An (1998)). This set of distributions includes the normal. Similar monotonicity results
cannot be obtained for the variance of log sales because the lognormal distribution is neither logconcave nor
logconvex in its entire domain.
19to (￿ ￿ 1)
2 ￿2
za. Straightforward intuition implies that given that the normal distribution of
growth rates is unimodal, censoring of the negative growth rates will reduce the variance of ￿rm
growth rates.
A number of instructive conclusions can be derived from the above derivations. First, the
selection mechanism alone implies that surviving small ￿rms grow faster than larger ￿rms.
Second, the same mechanism also implies that the variance of ￿rm growth would increases with
￿rm size, an implication in sharp contrast to Fact 2.22
4.2.2 Market Penetration Technology and Firm Growth
I now turn to study the e⁄ects of di⁄erent speci￿cations in the market penetration technology
on the growth of ￿rms, independently from the selection e⁄ect. To do so, I characterize the
instantaneous growth rate of the ￿rm in each market, which is not a⁄ected by entry and exit.
This analysis can be performed by applying Ito￿ s lemma to expression (8) for ￿rms with initial


























￿ c1s0 ￿ e
￿ c2s0 .
In equation (28) the ￿rst and second parenthetical terms represent the (instantaneous)
growth, E (dr=r); and the standard deviation of growth of a ￿rm of size s0 respectively. Propo-
sition 2 characterizes the relationship between the instantaneous growth rates of ￿rms of size
sij0 = s0 in a given market for di⁄erent values of ￿:
Proposition 2 Given A1-A2 and R1,
a) If ￿ ! 0 the instantaneous growth rate of all ￿rms is the same.
22In the Klette and Kortum (2004) model, the variance unconditional on survival is inversely proportional to
￿rm size. The decrease in the variance with ￿rm size happens since the sales of the ￿rm are proportional to the
number of goods that the ￿rm has. Since each good has the same variance, the total variance of ￿rm sales is
inversely proportional to ￿rm size in that model.
23See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) chapter 3 for the details of Ito￿ s lemma and related derivations. Since Brown-
ian motion paths exhibit in￿nite variation for any given time interval standard calculus does not apply. The
application of Ito￿ s Lemma requires the sales function to have a continuous second derivative. The function h(s)
does so for s > 0 but it does does not attain continuous derivatives at s = 0.
20b) There exist a ￿
0 2 (0;+1), such that 8 ￿ > ￿
0, then @ (E (dr=r))=@s0 < 0; and 8￿ < ￿
0,
then @ (E (dr=r))=@s0 > 0, for all ￿rms with s0 > 0.
Proof. To prove part (a) of proposition 2 I use De l￿Hospital rule to compute the terms in








￿! (￿ ￿ 1)
2 . (29)
To prove part (b) I look at the derivative of the ￿rst parenthetical term in expression (28) with







￿(￿ ￿ 1) + (￿ ￿ 1)
2 ￿2
z
￿ > 0 . (30)
If R1 is not satis￿ed there does not exists a value of ￿ for which the growth rates are decreasing
in size. The growth rate for very large ￿rms, s0 ! 1; is the same as the growth rate of all ￿rms
for ￿ ! 0.
For ￿ > 0, the model with endogenous market penetration costs also predicts an inverse
relationship between the sales of ￿rms in a market and the instantaneous variance of their
growth rates for that market as illustrated in the next proposition:
Proposition 3 Given A1-A2
a) If ￿ ! 0, the instantaneous variance of the growth rate is independent of ￿rm initial size.
b) If ￿ > 0, the instantaneous variance of the growth rate is higher the smaller the ￿rm
initial size.
Proof. See appendix A.4.
Overall, the endogenous cost model, with a high enough ￿, reconciles the inverse size-growth
relationship with the inverse size-variance of growth relationship, as indicated in Fact 2. The
intuition for both results is simple: for a given percentage change in ￿rm productivity changes
in the marketing margin are large for ￿rms with few consumers. Thus, for ￿rm of small relative
size the e⁄ective demand elasticity is very large, and their growth rate and volatility can be
large as well. The largest ￿rms make only small adjustments to their marketing margin and
the demand elasticity for these ￿rm is asymptotically constant, as discussed in the proof of
Proposition 2.
215 Calibration
The goal of this section is to determine the parameters of the model without using information
on the growth of ￿rm sales. The procedure that I propose allows to evaluate the ability of the
model to predict the relationship between ￿rm size and ￿rm growth without using micro-data
on individual ￿rm-growth rates. In order to do so, I exploit estimates from the trade literature
by mapping the multi-market structure of the model to information on exports to di⁄erent
countries.
As a rule, I choose the parameters that a⁄ect the cross-section of country trade ￿ ows and
￿rm sales, ￿2, ￿, and ￿ ￿ 1, using the results of the estimation of Eaton and Kortum (2002),
and information from the French exporting dataset of Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) as
exploited for the static version of this model in Arkolakis (2010). The moments in the French
dataset allow me, given ￿2, to identify ￿ and ￿ ￿ 1 independently from other parameters of
the model. In particular, these two parameters a⁄ect the predictions of the model for ￿rm-size
distribution ￿ and ￿rm growth￿but do not impact the prediction of the model for ￿rm selection
(since they do not a⁄ect the evolution and steady state distribution of ￿rm productivities).
To calibrate the stochastic process of ￿rm productivities and the parameters determining
the balanced growth path, information on ￿rm exit rates and US macroeconomic aggregates is
used. US data are easily accessible for all these statistics. Table 2 provides a summary of the
model calibration that I discuss in detail below and the sources used.
One potential concern is the use of moments from two di⁄erent countries for the calibration
of the model. While I have access to di⁄erent moments from US and France both these countries
are developed economies. In addition, the distribution of sales of manufacturing ￿rms in France
and the USA displays remarkable similarity as argued in Section 2. Having pointed out the
similarities across the two datasets I proceed using them to calibrate the model￿ s parameters.
5.1 Parameters from the static model
For the calibration of the parameters that determine the cross-section of sales I follow Arkolakis
(2010) since each cross-section of the dynamic model is identical to that setup. This paragraph
brie￿ y describes his procedure. The parameter ￿ governs ￿rm entry as a function of the pop-
ulation of the market and is set to ￿ = :44 to match the entry of French exporting ￿rms into
markets with di⁄erent population size. The parameter ￿ and the ratio ~ ￿ = ￿2=(￿ ￿ 1), jointly
22determine the cross-sectional sales heterogeneity. The choice of ￿ = :915 and ~ ￿ = 1:645 implies
that the model matches the size advantage in the domestic market (France) of proli￿c exporters
compared to ￿rms that export little or not at all.
Moreover, I exploit the mapping to the static model in order to calibrate the values of ￿2
and ￿, given the value of ~ ￿. The parameter ￿2 is key in determining the aggregate elasticity
of bilateral trade ￿ ows and the welfare properties of a wide class of multi-market models as
argued by Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2010). Thus, I use the estimate for the
trade elasticity of Eaton and Kortum (2002), ￿2 = 8:28, which falls in the middle of the range
of estimates reviewed by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004). I retain this parameter ￿xed
when I look at the predictions of the ￿xed cost model. Given ￿2 = 8:28 the value of ￿ that is
consistent with ~ ￿ = 1:645 is ￿ = 6:02. This value of ￿ is in the ballpark of the estimates of
Broda and Weinstein (2006) and also implies a markup of around 20% which is consistent with
values reported in the literature (see Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996)).24 For the ￿xed cost
model, ￿ = 0, I set ~ ￿ = 1:49, which is the benchmark calibration of Arkolakis (2010) for that
model, which given ￿2 = 8:28 requires ￿ = 6:55 for that model. The e⁄ect of changing ~ ￿ in the
￿xed cost model is discussed in the speci￿c exercises.
5.2 Parameters governing dynamics
To determine the value of the parameters that govern the aggregate dynamics of the model, I
use macroeconomic data for the US economy and US manufacturing census data from DRS.
The parameters g￿; g￿; gE govern primarily aggregate dynamics. The growth of the population
from 1960 onwards in the US is around 1:22% and the growth rate of real GDP per capita is
around 2%. Thus, I set g￿ = :0122 and g￿ = :02. Given the de￿nition of g￿, the growth of the
technological frontier of new ideas is
gE = g￿ ￿ g￿ (1 ￿ ￿)=(￿ ￿ 1) = 0:0187 .
The parameters ￿; gI and ￿z, which govern ￿rm dynamics, must also be speci￿ed. In the
24Whereas I use the mapping of my model to the Eaton and Kortum (2002) setup to use their estimate of
8:28 Luttmer picks the value of the coe¢ cient to be 9:56 to match the estimate of the upper tail of the size
distribution by Axtell (2001), ~ ￿ = 1:06, with a choice of ￿ = 10. This di⁄erence makes for most of the (small)
di⁄erences in the calibrated parameters, gI; gE and ￿z that I obtain below versus the ones used by Luttmer
(2007).
23model, ￿ regulates the exogenous death rate. Given that the probability of endogenous exit for
￿rms with large size is (practically) 0, I calibrate ￿ by looking at the death rate of these ￿rms.
This information is obtained by the US Manufacturing Census during the period 1996-2004,
where the tabulation of the largest manufacturing ￿rms is the one for 500 or more employees.
The data indicate an average exit rate of 0:89% per year for these ￿rms, in turn, ￿ is set at
0:0089.
The parameters gI and ￿z govern productivity (and thus ￿rm-) dynamics. Note that, ￿2,
which is an explicit function of these two parameters (equation (18)), was calibrated to the value
of 8:28. Thus, to jointly calibrate gI and ￿z, requires one more moment from the data which
is a function of these two parameters in the model. I obtain this information from the data by
looking at the cohort exit rates of US manufacturing ￿rms as reported by DRS. I use the exit
rate of 42% in the ￿rst 4 years for the ￿rst cohort analyzed by DRS. Using equations (18) and
(26) together with the empirical values for the elasticity of trade and the cohort exit rates a
simple method of moments implies the values gI = 0:24% and ￿z = 6:64%. These parameter
values imply that ￿ = gI ￿ gE = ￿1:63% for the incumbent ￿rms.
Notice that ￿, ￿z, and ￿ are present in equations (18) and (26) while ￿ and ￿ do not a⁄ect
these relationships. Additionally, for the ￿rm statistics generated by the model the di⁄erence
￿ = gI￿gE is important and not the value of the parameters separately.25 The crucial parameters
in this calibration are ￿, ￿, ￿ and ￿z. Given that ￿2 is a function of the last two the dynamic
model has only one extra key parameter than its static counterpart. Thus, the model maintains
contact with previous static heterogeneous ￿rm theories but nevertheless generates a series of
reliable quantitative predictions on ￿rm dynamics studied below.
Discussion of the calibrated parameters With the calibrated parameters, the expected
growth rates of the largest ￿rms are very close to zero, consistent with the related numbers
reported by Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2007) and Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin,
Krizan, Miranda, Nucci, and Sandusky (2009). The standard deviation of the sales of the largest
￿rms converges to (￿ ￿ 1)￿z = 33%, around 2 to 3 times what is reported in the data by Davis,
Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2007) and Comin and Mulani (2007) and also larger than
other estimations of models of ￿rm dynamics as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Lee
and Mukoyama (2008).26
25Thus, there is an additional degree of freedom in the calibration. I use this extra degree and chose gE so
that g￿ is the same in all model speci￿cations even if ￿￿ s might di⁄er (equation 22).
26This shortcoming of the model is the topic of Luttmer (2011).
24An obvious question that arises from this calibration is whether the assumption of a random
walk in logarithms is the right representation for ￿rm productivities. Ultimately, this question
is one of empirical nature, so that it falls beyond the scope of this paper. However, while
the predictions of the model with random walk will be tested in various dimensions, it worth
pointing out two things. First, despite the fact that this model is speci￿ed with a random walk in
productivities it still generates an autocorrelation of ￿rm sales of less than one. Second, even for
models that assume that ￿rm productivities follows an AR(1) process, very often the estimates
of the autoregressive coe¢ cient of the productivity process that are more consistent with the
data are close to one (see for example Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Lee and Mukoyama
(2008), and Alessandria and Choi (2007)).
6 Quantitative Results
I now turn to look at the predictions of the calibrated model for ￿rm exit, growth and the
￿rm-size distribution. E⁄ectively, all of the predictions of the model below are out of sample
predictions.
6.1 Firm Exit
In the next two subsections, I study the implications of the model for the patterns of exit and
sales growth for incumbent and entry cohorts. To compare the outcomes of the model with the
DRS statistics I look at the predictions of the model every ￿ve years, e⁄ectively conducting a
￿ve-year census in the model generated data. To measure entrants and exitors I resemble as
closely as possible the DRS methodology and classify a ￿rm that exits in a census-year and
re-enters in a later census as an exitor when it leaves and as an entrant when it re-enters.27
The predictions of the calibrated model for the cumulative exit rates of incumbent and new
cohorts are illustrated in Table 3. The model closely matches the exit rate of incumbent cohorts
for a period of two decades as well as the entry cohort exit rates for a period of 15 years.
The high exit rates for the ￿rst cohort years are the implication of the high concentration of
￿rms close to the cuto⁄ productivity. The fraction of ￿rms concentrated close to this cuto⁄ is
naturally higher among entry cohorts ￿rms, which is the feature of the model that accounts for
the di⁄erences in exit rates among entry and incumbent cohorts.
27See footnote 13 in DRS.
25Discussion of the results: sunk costs of entry The success of the model in generating
the exit patterns in the US census data challenges the view that sunk costs are necessary to
explain the entry and exit behavior of ￿rms. Whereas the existence of a sunk cost would not
refrain the model from generating the exit rates observed in the US data this existence would
nevertheless imply that the average size of entrants is larger than the average size of exitors.
Di⁄erent calibrations of the Luttmer (2007) model (analyzed in appendix A.5) suggest that the
model requires the average size of entrants to be about 15%-25% larger than the average size
of exitors in order to match the exit rates in the data, which comes in sharp contrasts to the
evidence presented in Table 1.28 For the above reasons, notwithstanding its tractability, the
marketing theory that I introduce appears to be a valuable tool for the analysis of the entry
and exit patterns of ￿rms. Below, I also discuss its implications for ￿rm growth and sizes that
crucially depend on ￿ and ￿.
6.2 Firm Growth
To illuminate the prediction of the two models in terms of ￿rm growth Figure 7 presents a
scatterplot of the ratio of ￿rm ￿nal to initial size on ￿rm initial size (its initial sales percentile).
The graph e⁄ectively illustrates the distribution of ￿rm growth rates conditional on ￿rm initial
size.
Starting from the simpler case of the calibrated model with ￿ = 0, in the right panel of the
Figure, ￿rms with negative productivity growth may select out of the market, the more likely
so the lower their initial size. This selection mechanism implies that the expected growth rate is
inversely related to size (expression (27)) but it also implies that the variance of the distribution
of ￿rm growth rates increases with ￿rm size, in sharp contradiction with Fact 2. Introducing
the marketing choice of ￿rms implies that the distribution of growth rates is fundamentally
di⁄erent, with the case of ￿ = :915 featuring some small ￿rms with phenomenally high growth
rates. Thus, the relationship between ￿rm growth and initial size is still inverse. In addition,
due to the large volatility of the marketing margin, the endogenous cost model reconciles this
relationship with the inverse relationship between the variance of ￿rm growth and initial ￿rm
size.
28A model with large sunk costs generates hazard rates for entry cohorts that are initially increasing, as argued
by Ruhl and Willis (2008). This implication is counterfactual both for the DRS data and other datasets as noted
by Ericson and Pakes (1998).
26I also compare the predictions of the model to the average size of incumbent and new
cohorts in DRS in Table 3. The benchmark model can match the small contribution of the
entering cohort but eventually overpredicts the size of the survivors in this entry cohort (and
underpredicts the average size of ￿rms in the incumbent cohort). Thus, the model probably
implies more growth for the new entrants/small ￿rms than what is seen in the DRS data. The
main tension between the ￿xed cost model and the data is that the model overpredicts the size
of the entrants. Decreasing ~ ￿ (increasing ￿) increases the dispersion of sizes between small and
large ￿rms for both incumbent and entry cohorts. As illustrated in the online theory appendix,
for ~ ￿ = 1:25 the ￿xed model achieves satisfactory predictions in this dimension but for higher
and lower ~ ￿ the model substantially deviates from the data. As it will be obvious from the above
discussion, di⁄erent values of ~ ￿ do not improve other key shortcomings of the ￿xed cost model.
In Figure 8 I illustrate the quantitative predictions of the model regarding the variance of
growth rates using available moments for publicly traded US manufacturing ￿rms analyzed by
Amaral, Buldyrev, Havlin, Leschhorn, Mass, Salinger, Stanley, and Stanley (1997) and tabu-
lated by employment bins (1-10 employees, 10-100 etc). In general, the endogenous cost model
overpredicts the variance of growth rates observed in the data (except for the size bin of 10-100
employees), but captures the inverse relationship of variance of ￿rm growth and ￿rm size. The
￿xed cost model predicts a (slightly) increasing relationship.
Discussion of the results: declining sales elasticity and learning I have argued that
carefully modeling marketing costs within a setup where productivities follow Gibrat￿ s law can
bring the predictions of the model related to ￿rm growth very close to what is observed to the
data. This modeling of marketing generates a demand elasticity that declines with ￿rm size,
so that the theory lends itself to a variety of di⁄erent interpretations, as discussed in Arkolakis
(2010) (e.g. heterogeneous consumer tastes, multiple products etc).
A di⁄erent explanation from the one I propose is the idea of learning as suggested e.g. by
Jovanovic (1982) or Eaton, Eslava, Krizan, Kugler, and Tybout (2009). Learning could serve as
an explanation for the relationship between ￿rm exit and growth on size or age. The calibration
proposed for the model in this paper can be considered to have an advantage versus that ap-
proach. On the one hand, the predictions of a learning model depend on the parameterization
of the demand function, the distribution of prior productivities, and the current shock to pro-
ductivities. This challenging task has received only little attention in the literature so far.29 On
29See the discussion of Jovanovic (1982) Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) and Ericson and Pakes (1998).
27the other hand, the calibration proposed for this paper generates plausible predictions whereas
it is not at all clear that the learning explanation by itself can has as much predictive power.
6.3 Firm Size Distribution
The predictions of the model for the overall ￿rm size distribution are the ones analyzed by
Arkolakis (2010) and are illustrated, for completeness, in Figure 9. Both models can match the
Pareto right tail of the distribution but only the model with ￿ > 0 can explain the existence
of many small ￿rms in the data (deviations from Pareto). In the model with ￿ > 0 small ￿rms
endogenously reach very few consumers leading, at the same time, to a failure of Gibrat￿ s law
and to a size distribution more curved than the Pareto for that model.
Figure 10 illustrates the predictions of the model for the size distribution of ￿rms with di⁄er-
ent ages.30 Due to selection and the stochastic evolution of productivities, the size distribution
shifts to the right with age. In addition, the endogenous cost model quantitatively generates the
main features in the Brazilian data of Cabral and Mata (2003): it implies enough dispersion for
the distribution of young ￿rms whereas the distribution of older ￿rms eventually approximates
a log-normal distribution. Two di⁄erences arise with the ￿xed cost model, which falls short of
predicting the employment size distribution observed in the Portuguese data. First, given that
entrants are concentrated around the entry point, the absence of the marketing decision implies
a small dispersion in the size distribution, and thus almost all young ￿rms are concentrated
around the minimum employment size. Second, because of the fact that selection forces act
only on the left tail of the distribution, absent of the marketing choice the shape of the distrib-
ution of old ￿rms is not symmetric. This choice primarily a⁄ects the left tail of the distribution
and thus it remedies the shortcomings of the ￿xed cost model by generating a roughly symmetric
distribution for the older ￿rms.
6.4 Additional Evidence: International Trade
To subject the theory into further scrutiny and evaluate its predictions for turnover and growth
into di⁄erent markets I use the Brazilian manufacturing exporting transactions data to the
For a related structural approach see Abbring and Campbell (2003).
30Cabral and Mata (2003) use the largest worker tenure in the ￿rm to approximate ￿rm age. To generate
statistics from the model as comparable as possible to theirs I consider a ￿rm as an exitor the ￿rst year it has
zero sales. Thus, a 15 year old ￿rm is one that operates continuously for 15 years. I also calibrate   to match
the average size of manufacturing Portuguese ￿rms.
28di⁄erent Brazilian exporting destinations. These data only contain information on export sales
but all the theoretical predictions of the model apply to the entry-exit and sales behavior of
the ￿rm in a given destination market.31 The data cover the universe of Brazilian merchandise
exporting transactions from 1990-2001 and are described in Molina and Muendler (2008) and
Arkolakis and Muendler (2010). I aggregate these data at the ￿rm-destination level and consider
the top 50 exporting destinations.
In the online data appendix I replicate the Figures 2 and 3 and argue that qualitatively the
patterns of exit and growth of the Brazilian exporters are very similar to the ones illustrated
in the US manufacturing data by DRS. The main di⁄erence that stands out in the export data
is the higher exit rate of exporters in their early years. For example the exit rate of entry
cohorts is around 15 percentage points higher in the export data for both incumbent and entry
cohorts. The resulting stronger e⁄ects of selection are also re￿ ected in a higher growth rate for
the surviving exporters. Notice that the robust feature of the US manufacturing census data
that the average size of entrants and exitors is approximately the same repeats itself in the
Brazilian data, a ￿nding already pointed out by Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout (2008) for
Colombian manufacturing exporters.32
Exporting transactions data are well-suited to test the predictions of the model regarding
the i) entry-exit process ii) and the distribution of ￿rm growth rates conditional on initial size.
In particular, exporting transactions data allow to monitor ￿rms that continuously enter and
exit from certain markets even if their size in these markets is very small. Regarding the ￿rst
prediction, the calibrated model predicts that a ￿rm that exits a market has a high probability
of exporting again there in the near future. For example, in the model, 36% of the times that a
￿rm exits a market it will return to the same destination in the next 3 years. For the Brazilian
data the mean of this probability across the sample years is strictly positive, but slightly lower,
around 28%. To test the second prediction I look at Brazilian exporters and their growth at
the top Brazilian destination, the United States. Figure 11 creates a scatterplot of conditional
31In the online data appendix, I test the prediction that the growth of the ￿rm in each market depends
on its size in the market and not its overall size (captured by a ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect) and ￿nd strong support for
this hypothesis. Correlation on the sales of the ￿rms across di⁄erent destinations can be added in the model,
without a⁄ecting this result, by assuming that the productivity (or equivalently some random demand shock)
for each destination is the weighted sum of independent Brownian motions. The speci￿cation of the weights can
determine the correlation across destinations.
32For the robustness of the exporter-size distribution see Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) and Arkolakis
and Muendler (2010). See also Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout (2008) and Albornoz, Corcos, Ornelas, and
Pardo (2009) for evidence on the growth-size relationship of exporters.
29growth rates of exporters comparable to Figure 7 for the model. The distribution of growth
rates is very much in line with the predictions of the model with ￿ > 0: some small ￿rms
exhibit extremely high growth rates and the distribution of small ￿rm growth rates has much
higher variance (more details available in the online data appendix). Despite its simplicity the
endogenous cost model captures the main salient features of the growth rates of exporters.
7 Application: The Size-Growth Debate
Do small ￿rms grow faster? This question has been at the center of an academic and policy de-
bate over the past three decades. The evidence for violations of the independence of ￿rm growth
rate and size (i.e. violations of Gibrat￿ s law) reviewed in section 2.2 are cited as justi￿cation for
di⁄erential treatment for small businesses (see for example Birch (1981, 2010)).
The comprehensive econometric analysis by Evans (1987a,b) shows that the negative growth-
size relationship is robust to controlling for sample truncation caused by the exit of smaller
￿rms. Methodologically, Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) and Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and
Schuh (2010) challenge the inverse size-growth relationship in the basis of the interaction of
size classi￿cation and possible regression to the mean ￿ the tendency of ￿rms that experience
a growth shock in one period to experience an opposite shock in the next one￿ . They instead
propose an alternative measure of ￿rm growth by considering ￿rm initial size as its mean size
in the two periods. Using this metric they ￿nd that the size growth relationship disappears in
many of their speci￿cations.
Whereas I have argued that small ￿rms grow faster, many of them at very high growth rates,
when I use the metric of growth proposed by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) to measure
growth in the model the inverse size growth relationship disappears, as discussed in more detail
in the online theoretical appendix. This happens since the productivity growth in the model is
not a mean reverting process and thus there is no miss-classi￿cation bias for smaller ￿rms and
of course no measurement error. Thus, small ￿rms are being misclassi￿ed in high initial sizes,
exactly when they grow fast, a weakness of their metric also pointed out by Neumark, Wall,
and Zhang (2011). Of course, whether the productivity process of ￿rms is better represented
by a random walk or a mean reverting process is an unresolved question where perhaps future
empirical work will be of most value. Instead this paper illustrates how new theories can generate
predictions that test the size growth relationship in a variety of dimensions.
308 Conclusion
This paper develops a simple uni￿ed framework to analyze ￿rm selection and growth. The
framework is based on the modeling of marketing choice ￿ and thus demand￿at the ￿rm-level.
The model allows for a parsimonious calibration that nevertheless implies a good ￿t to a num-
ber of statistics in the data. The success of this framework suggests that carefully modeling
marketing costs could be a promising avenue for a deeper understanding of ￿rm dynamics.
A key modeling simpli￿cation used in this paper is that ￿rms incur the marketing cost to
reach consumers in each period, without being able to build continuing customer relationships.
This simpli￿cation made the analysis highly tractable by keeping ￿rm e¢ ciency as the only
current decision state of the ￿rm. Other approaches, such as the customer capital models of
Drozd and Nosal (2011) and Gourio and Rudanko (2010), or the buyer-seller matching model
of Eaton, Eslava, Krizan, Kugler, and Tybout (2009) explore various ways of formalizing this
accumulation process. This research may lead to models that account for the di⁄erences in the
short-run versus long-run behavior of ￿rms and also the importance of age in their decisions.
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34Statistics/Census Year 1963 1967 1972 1977 1982 mean
Entrants Relative Size - .352 .396 .308 .346 .350
Exitors Relative Size .353 .399 .338 .351 - .360
Table 1: Size of Firms Entering and Exiting Relative to All Firms Source: Numbers calculated
using market shares (Table 2) and exit rates (Table 8) from DRS
Benchmark Param. Value Source/Target
Cross Section Cross-sectional exporting data
￿ 0:44 Arkolakis (2010)
￿2 8:28 Eaton & Kortum (2002)
￿ 6:02 Sales advantage of proli￿c exporters in France:
￿ :915 Arkolakis (2010), Eaton, Kortum & Kramarz (2011)
Balanced Growth US macroeconomic aggregates
g￿ 0:0122 US population growth
g￿ 0:02 US GDP growth
gE 0:0187 US GDP growth
Idiosyncratic Product. US manufacturing Census data
￿ 0:0089 Death rate of ￿rms with 500+ employees
gI 0:0024 Exit rates of 1963 cohort from Dunne, Roberts
￿z 0:0664 & Samuelson (1988) (& the value of ￿2)
Table 2: Model Parameterization
Statistic / Cohort year 0 5 10 15
Entry cohort exit rate
Data (mean ￿ 67-￿ 77 cohorts) 0.62 0.79 0.88
model 0.63 0.80 0.88
Inc. cohort exit rate
Data (mean ￿ 67-￿ 77 cohorts) 0.48 0.65 0.76
model 0.47 0.67 0.79
Entry cohort mean sales
Data (mean ￿ 67-￿ 77 cohorts) 0.35 0.61 0.99 1.32
model (￿ > 0) 0.38 0.89 1.37 1.85
model (￿ = 0) 0.61 0.92 1.23 1.55
Inc. cohort mean sales
Data (mean ￿ 67-￿ 77 cohorts) 1.02* 1.65 2.37 3.07
model (￿ > 0) 1.00 1.63 2.22 2.82
model (￿ = 0) 1.00 1.41 1.83 2.27
Table 3: Cohort Exit Rates and Average Sizes in the Data and the Model Source: DRS and
model simulations. Mean sales are constructed from DRS for the 1967, 1972, and 1977 censuses that
were conducted every 5 years using exit rates and market shares. Approximation error appears due to

















Figure 1: Double Pareto distribution
Figure 2: Incumbent and Entry Cohorts Exit Rate in the US Manufacturing Census
36Figure 3: Incumbent and Entry Cohort Average Sales (of surviving ￿rms) in the US Manufac-
turing Data
Figure 4: Distribution of total sales of US manufacturing census ￿rms and of
French sales of French manufacturing.
Source: US data are obtained from the Small Business Administration and French data from Eaton,
Kortum, and Kramarz (2011). Note: For the US census ￿rms the maximum point of each bin reported
and the number of ￿rms included in the bin is used to plot the sales size of the ￿rms and the corre-
sponding percentiles. Mean sales are referring to mean sales of all US manufacturing census ￿rms and
mean sales in France of French manufacturing ￿rms.
37Figure 5: Distribution of total sales of US manufacturing census ￿rms.
Source: Small Business Administration. Note: I use the maximum point of each reported bin and the
number of ￿rms included in the bin to plot the sales size of the ￿rms and the corresponding percentiles.
Figure 6: Distribution of Sales by Age Cohort. Source Cabral and Mata (2003).
38Figure 7: Firm Percentiles and Firm Growth Rates in the Calibrated Model. Endogenous Cost
(left panel) and Exogenous Cost (right panel).












































Data, Amaral et al
Endogenous Cost Model
Fixed Cost Model
Figure 8: Standard Deviation of Firm Growth Rates and Firm Initial Employment size.
Source: Data for US Manufacturing ￿rms in compustat tabulated by Amaral, Buldyrev, Havlin,
Leschhorn, Mass, Salinger, Stanley, and Stanley (1997).
39Figure 9: Size Distribution of US Manufacturing Firms and the Model.
Figure 10: Employment Distribution for Firm with Di⁄erent Ages in the Endogenous Cost (left
panel) and Fixed Cost (right panel) Models.
40Figure 11: Brazilian Exporter Percentiles and Exporter Growth Rates in the United
States
Source: Brazilian exporting transactions data 1990-2001.
41A Appendix
A.1 Preliminary de￿nitions and facts
In the various proofs and derivations of this appendix I am going to use the following de￿nitions
and well known facts for the Normal distribution quoted as properties P. Notice that the pdf
















P 1 The inverse mill￿ s ratio of the Normal, ’(x)=￿(￿x), is increasing in x, 8x 2 (￿1;+1).













, where ￿(x) is the cdf of the standard normal cdf
P 4
R














, for some constants ~ c1; ~ c2 > 0
A.2 Deriving the Stationary Distribution of Productivities
A simple guess for the solution of the Kolmogorov equation (11) is f (s) = A1e￿1s + A2e￿￿2s




i ￿(gI ￿ gE)￿i￿
g￿ (1 ￿ ￿) = 0, where i = 1;2. Using condition (12) set A2 = 0 for s < ￿ si and using the
requirement that f (s) is a probability density set A1 = 0 for s ￿ ￿ si.









￿1￿ si + A2￿2e
￿￿2￿ si￿
= g￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ,










￿￿2sds = 1 ,
imply that A1 = ￿1￿2=(￿1 + ￿2)e￿￿1￿ si , A2 = ￿1￿2=(￿1 + ￿2)e￿2￿ si . Notice that the solutions also
satisfy the ￿rst term in the LHS of (15) since they imply that f (￿ si￿) = f (￿ si+). In other words
the distribution is continuous, but the derivative has a kink at ￿ si.
A.3 Exit Rates and Firm Sales
Firm Survival in a market The objective is to compute the probability that a ￿rm will be
selling in a market after a years (so that sija ￿ 0), conditional on the initial productivity of the
￿rm today, sij0 = s0. I denote this probability by S (ajs0) and thus, using expression (10),

















42which using change of variables yields equation (25) in the main text.
Cohort Survival Rates The expression to be derived is expression (26): the probability
that a ￿rm in an incumbent cohort, among all the currently operating ￿rms, sij0 ￿ 0, also oper-
ates after time a has elapsed, sija ￿ 0. If I denote this probability as Pr(sija ￿ 0jsij0 ￿ 0), then
taking in account random death the cohort survival rate is Sij (a) = e￿￿a Pr(sija ￿ 0jsij0 ￿ 0).
I ￿rst derive the probability,
















Pr(sija = sajsij0 = s0)dsads0 (31)





The inner integral of expression (31) is given by equation (25). Thus, by replacing expressions
(25), (32) in (31) and using integration by parts,
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where I used property P3 for the last equality. Combining the expressions with the random
death term gives the survival function, Sij (a), expression (26).
In the online appendix I show that Sij (a) is increasing in ￿, and if ￿ < 0, Sij (a) is decreasing
in a, DSij (a) < 0. The results are applications of the properties of the normal distribution.
Expected Log Sales Here I sketch the derivations for the expected growth and variance
of growth of the log sales of ￿rms described in section 4.2.1. To derive that I have to derive






+ (￿ ￿ 1)sij~ t+a . (33)
The ￿rst term is deterministic so that derivations are easy. To compute the moments of the
second term I can compute the moment generating function (MGF) of this term. I start by
computing the moment generating function of some variable ~ sa that is normally distributed as
(￿ ￿ 1)sij~ t+a but with di⁄erent parameters. Let the mean be ~ ￿, the variance ~ ￿2 and the lower






































￿ ~ x￿~ ￿
~ ￿
￿ = e








￿ ~ x￿~ ￿
~ ￿
￿
where in the last equality I used the de￿nition of the cdf of the normal distribution. I can now
adjust the parameters of the distribution so that they correspond to the current ￿rm sales size
and the underlying stochastic process: ~ ￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)s0 + (￿ ￿ 1)￿a, ~ ￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)￿z
p
a, ~ x = 0.
Finally, I can compute the moments of the second term of equation (33) by computing the
successive derivatives of the MGF wrt to ~ c.
A.4 Proofs of Proposition 2 and 3












0. Extended derivations for this proposition given in an online appendix imply that it is equiv-
alent to show that
￿(￿ ￿ 1)
h￿






















so that for ~ ￿ = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) I need to show (notice that e
s
(￿￿1)















This expression after some manipulations gives the condition in equation (30). Notice that if
￿(￿ ￿ 1) + (￿ ￿ 1)
2 ￿2
z < 0 there does not exist a ￿ 2 [0;+1) that satis￿es the inequality.
Proof of Proposition 3 The proof of the proposition uses Ito￿ s Lemma. In particular, the
variance of the instantaneous growth rate of ￿rms is given by the square of the second bracketed
term in expression (28). Given (29) this term equals to ￿2
z (￿ ￿ 1)
2 for ￿ ! 0. For the second
part of the proposition, given ￿ > 0, the derivative of the term is always negative. Thus, the
instantaneous variance of growth rates of ￿rms selling to a destination is inversely related to
their size there. In the limit for sij0 ! +1 the term tends to ￿2
z (￿ ￿ 1)
2 completing the proof
of the proposition.
A.5 Sunk Costs
I consider di⁄erent calibrations of the sunk cost model and the implied di⁄erence for the entrants
and exitors that they imply. The key equation that I use from the model of Luttmer (2007) is
his equation (19). Using this equation, the exercise that I perform is to consider the average
44di⁄erence of exitors to entrants that will imply a 60% 5-year exit rate for the entry cohort (as in
the US manufacturing data). For the calibrated parameters that I consider the model requires
an average size of entrants to exitors that is around 22% higher whereas with the calibration of
Luttmer this number is around 25%. If given the calibration of the rest of the parameters in
Luttmer I choose a lower ￿ = 6:5 (instead of his choice of ￿ = 10) the average size di⁄erence is
at around 15%, still much larger than zero albeit lower.
45